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This thesis presents a ballistic missile defense allo-
cation model for the terminal defense of urban targets of
varied value. The model allocates interceptors in propor-
tion to the value of targets. Defensive missiles have a
probability of interception, offensive re-entry vehicles
are perfect, and the offense knows both the defensive allo-
cation and firing doctrine. The area defended by a single
interceptor farm is considered to be a point target and can
be defended by no other interceptors. For any value of the
offensive payoff in expected value per re-entry vehicle,
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis considers the terminal defense of a set of
urban point targets of varied value in which the role of
the defense is to minimize damage during a large attack by
an offensive force of nuclear ballistic missiles. The at-
tack is assumed to be sequential. The offense receives no
information concerning the destruction of any target, and
the defense does not know the size of the attack at any tar-
get. Specifically considered is the minmax allocation of
interceptor missiles based on the assumption that the of-
fense knows both the allocation of interceptors and the in-
terceptor commitment policy at each target. This analysis
ignores interactions with area defenses and assumes a con-
stant single shot kill probability p < 1 associated with
one interceptor against one re-entry vehicle. Branch [1]
considers a similar problem but makes different simplifying
assumptions. Shaver [2] considers a radar defense problem
that is closely related to the defense of urban point tar-
gets. Shaver's objective function for the defense is to
maximize the expected number of re-entry vehicles engaged.
Battle [3] considers city defense and minimizes the maximum
average damage per attacker. He drops the point target as-
sumption but does not consider firing doctrine.
An important concept for ballistic missile defense
studies is that of the price of a target. Price is defined
to be the number of re-entry vehicles r sent against a tar-
get, divided by the probability K that the target is killed:
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price = r/K. One can speak of the price that the offense
"pays" to "buy" the target. The offensive payoff X at a
single target is the value V of the target times the recip-
rocal of price: X = KV/r. X = ^^J"





forces the offense to pay a price that is proportional to
the value of a target. For certain sets of targets, par-
ticularly those in which many defended targets are not
attacked by the optimal offense, proportional defense will
minimize expected target damage for a fixed force of inter-
ceptors. It is assumed that proportional defense is optimal
in this sense for the set of targets under consideration.
The method of requiring price to be proportional to value
will be to allocate interceptors in such a manner that the
offensive payoff is the same at each target. Rather than
allocate a fixed force of interceptors, the model minimizes
the number of interceptors required to force the offensive
payoff to be less than or equal to a fixed payoff X* .

II. THE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A. OFFENSE
The offense must allocate a fixed force R of re-entry
vehicles (R.V.'s) to a set of N targets of varied value in
such a way as to maximize total expected fatalities. Sup-
pose the damage functions f.(r.)> i = 1,...,N give the ex-
pected fatalities at the i"th target for an attack of r.
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where R = (ri,r2, . .
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,rN ) , the offensive allocation. It is
assumed that the f. are continuous and differentiable . From
l
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions or directly from Gibb's Lemma,
there exists a X° such that:
df. (r.°)
1 x
= A , r.° >dr " ' l
<> A . r.° =
where r .° is the optimal attack at the i tn target. That is,
the marginal value is the same at each target that is at-
tacked. Note that A is the slope of £.(r.) at r. = r . °
.
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See Figure 1. The optimal offensive solution requires X°
to be the maximum marginal return obtainable subject to
Zr. = R.
1
Suppose a target is defended by I . interceptors with
single shot kill probability of one. The damage function odfacA
fat*
for a defended target is f
.
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Note that X. is the maximum offensive payoff at target i,
in terms of expected fatalities per R.V. This value X. is
the slope of the ray from the origin tangent to f . . See
Figure 2.
Consider a ray from the origin with slope A . See
Figure 3. Given the value of X°, the offense finds the op-
timal attack size against each target by finding r. to




offense can find an optimal solution to the overall problem
by suboptimizing at each target.
B. DEFENSE
Since the defense assumes that the offense knows the
target damage function f.(r.) and the interceptor allocation
T = (Ii,...,IN), the defensive problem for a fixed intercep-
tor stockpile I is :
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Recall that for fixed I the offense was able to Max
Ef.(r.) by suboptimization,
Max (f.(r. - I.) - X° r.)
.




The corresponding defensive suboptimization is
Min { Max ff.fr. - I.) - X° r.) } .
T




It is not generally true, however, that suboptimization will
yield an optimal allocation for problems in which minmax >
maxmin (see for example, [Ref. 4]), but if many defended
targets are not attacked the suboptimization yields the op-
timal allocation. A proportional defense, in which X. is
equal to a fixed X* for all i, accomplishes the suboptimiza-




(r. - I.) - X* r.) = 0.
r
i
The remainder of this thesis develops a model for de-
termining a proportional allocation of interceptors for the
defense of point targets when the interceptor single shot
kill probability is less than 1.
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III. THE DEFENSIVE MODEL
Recall that p is the interceptor single shot kill
probability and define q = 1 - p, the probability that a
re-entry vehicle (R.V.) survives an encounter with a single
interceptor. Define i = the number of interceptors sentr m r
against the mth R.V. Thus the probability that the mth r.v.
i
is killed is (1-q ) and the probability that the target is
killed for an attack of size r is:
r i
K = 1 - n, (1-q m )
.
m=l v H J
Recall the offensive payoff A at a single target is X = KV/r
It is assumed that at each city the offense desires to max
r
KV/r.
The method used to arrive at proportional defense is to
minimize the number of interceptors I allocated to a target,
subject to X £ X*. Suppose that the defense fires against
some number M of R.V.'s, so that the problem at each target
is :
M •
Min I = St im=l m
s.t. KV/r < X* r = 1,2, . .
.
An offensive strategy is a choice of r, and a defensive
strategy is a choice of a sequence of i 's called the firing
doctrine and denoted FD = (i i , i 2 , . . • , ij • It is assumed for
convenience that the defense never fires more than three in-
terceptors at an R.V. Thus the defense must choose a number
12

B such that i =3, m=l,2,...,B: a number A such that
m '
i = 2 , m = B+1.....A: and an M such that i = 1, m =
A+1,...,M. Of course A and B may be zero. Notice that for
a fixed firing doctrine K depends only on r. Since the of-
fense knows the defensive firing doctrine, the defense must
determine the firing doctrine that minimizes I and such that






A special case will serve to introduce some basic con-
cepts. Consider a target of value V. Suppose that I, the
number of interceptors at the target, is arbitrarily large
but that the firing doctrine calls for firing only one in-
terceptor at each R.V. The firing doctrine is not optimal,
but illustrative due to its simplicity. Define the payoff
curve
,
L to be L = KV. Notice that since FD and p are fixed,
K and hence L depend only on r. See Figure 4. The offen-
sive payoff for an attack of size r is the slope of the ray,
called the A-line, from the origin to the curve L(r). The
slope of the A-line is KV/r and thus corresponding to each
r there is a A-line, designated A(r). Note that A(r) is not
the expected value obtained by the r tn R.V. but is the av-
erage expected value per R.V. for an attack of size r:
r 1 m.A(r) = KV/r. Now note that K = 1 - U
±
(1-q ) is strictly
concave in r for i constant. Thus L(r") = K(r)V is strictly
concave and A(r) > A(r+1). That is, the offense receives
decreasing marginal and average returns for increasing r
when i is constant. Thus to maximize KV/r the optimal at-
m ' r
tack r° for the target and firing doctrine described is to
fire one R.V. Thus r° = 1 and A(r°) = KV/r where K = 1 - p.
Then A = A(r°) = (l-p)V is the payoff at this target.
Define the A*-line to be a ray from the origin with





force A < A*, i.e., KV/r < A*. Graphically, the defense
must force the slope of the A-line to be less than A* for
any size attack. Alternatively, the defense will be satis-
fied if L(r) is always below the A*-line. That is,
L(r) < A*r. In Figure 2, L i is a feasible payoff curve
since Li(r) < A*r and L2 is not feasible since there are
values of r such that the offensive payoff is greater than
A*.
Leaving the special case, consider the criterion for
defending a target. Note that if a target has value
V < A*, r > 1 yields A < A* and thus the target will not be
defended. A target of value greater than A* must be de-
fended since if undefended, r = 1 yields a payoff greater
than A*.
Consider the situation at any defended target. Define
R = V/A* where V is the value of the target. See Figure 5.
For an attack of size r > R, the value of the A*-line is
A*r > V. Since maximum value of L(r) is V, it is clear that
for r > R the constraint is always satisfied, i.e.,
L(r) < A*r. Thus the defense will never fire at more than
R - 1 R.V.'s. If the defense were to fire at fewer than
R - 1 R.V.'s, the R - l s "t (or an earlier one, since the of-
fense does not have shoot-look-shoot capability) would de-
stroy the target. Then A = KV/r where K=l,r=R-l, and
R > 1 since V > A*. Thus
:





For feasibility the defense must fire against at least R - 1
R.V.'s and for optimality it must fire at exactly R - 1 R.V.'s
An attack of size r = R is called exhausting . For an exhaust-
ing attack, the offense will receive a payoff of A*. Since
the defense will choose a firing doctrine such that the of-
fense never receives more than A*, an optimal offensive
strategy must be to exhaust the interceptor supply; r° = R.
However, since fractional interceptors or R.V.'s are not
allowed, R must be integer valued, but V/A* is not generally
integer. Integer considerations are ignored during the
analysis for ease of exposition, but numerical calculations
use R = [(V/A*) + .999] where [x] is the largest integer in
x.
In summary, note that the offense receives decreasing
marginal returns for constant i , targets are defended ift> m' 6
and only if V > A*, M = (V/A*) - 1, and an optimal offen-
sive strategy is r° = V/A*. At any defended target, the
only remaining problem is to determine a firing doctrine
such that A <, A*.
Three classes of targets will be considered: small
targets, for which A = B = 0, that is it suffices to send
one interceptor against each R.V. ; medium targets, which
require A > 0; and large targets, which require B > and
A > 0.
B. SMALL TARGETS
Consider a target of small value in relation to p and
A* so that; (l-p)V < A* < V. Then FD° = (i ! ,
i
2 , . . . ,
i




i = 1 , m = 1,2,. ...R-l is optimal with I = .E- i = R - 1.
m ' ' ' ' r i=l m
This is shown by noting that FD° is feasible since r = 1
yields X = (l-p)V which is less than or equal to X* by as-
sumption, and the offense receives decreasing returns for
r < R - 1. Since all i =1, FD° is certainly least cost
m J
and the defense must fire at R - 1 R.V.'s. Thus FD° is
optimal. Figure 6 shows the payoff curve for this example.
The offense may be considered to be facing this payoff
curve when making an allocation of R.V.'s to targets, and
it is clear graphically that the optimal attack is r° = R.
If (l-p)V = X* an alternate offensive optimum is r° = 1.
In either case, r° yields X*.
C. MEDIUM TARGETS
In the example above the firing doctrine or commitment
rule was to fire one interceptor at each of the first R-l
R.V.'s. Consider another target (or a different X* or p)
such that (l-p) 2 V < X* < (l-p)V. If the defense maintains
the same firing doctrine, the resulting payoff curve is
shown in Figure 7. Now the offense receives X > X* for
r < ri, and the optimal attack is r° = 1, yielding
X = (l-p)V > X*. The value of this target is too high in
relation to X* for the defense to fire only one interceptor
at the first R.V. Recall that the defense must still fire
at exactly R-l R.V.'s. Suppose the firing doctrine
FD = (ii,...,i n , ) i = 2, m = 1,2,. ...A; i = 1, m =v i
> 'R-l' m ' ' ' ' ' m
A+1,...,R-1. Consider the case A = 1. If (l-p)V is only













but in general the payoff curve is as shown in Figure 8.
Now for ri < r < r 3 the offense receives A > A* and r° = r 2 .
Consider the firing doctrine with A = R - 1. This
firing doctrine must be feasible since K(l) = 1- (1- (1-p) 2 ) =
(1-p) 2 and A(l) = (1-p) 2V < A* by assumption, and the of-
fense receives decreasing returns for i constant. That is,6 m '
A(m) > A(m+1) , m = l,2,...,R-2. Thus some A < R - 1 is
feasible and it is obvious that the minimum feasible A dic-
tates the least cost firing doctrine. Then
R-l
I = E, i
m=l m
and
I = 2A + R-1-A = A+R-1.
The payoff curve facing the offense is shown in Figure 9.
Thus the optimal attack is r° = R with possible alternate
optima at r° = 1 and r° = r^ . In any case, r° yields A*.
D. LARGE TARGETS
Now suppose (1-p) 3 V < A* < (1-p) 2 V. Reasoning as above,
note that this city is too valuable in relation to A* for
the defense to fire only two interceptors at the first R.V.
Notice that if ii = 2 then r = 1 yields A = (l-p) 2 V > A*.
Thus the defense must use the firing doctrine FD = (i i , . . .
i
R _ , )
;
i = 3, m = 1,2, ...,B; i = 2, m = B +1,...,A; i = 1, m =
A+1,...,R-1. Notice that B = R - 1 is feasible since against
this doctrine; r = 1 yields A = (1-p) 3 V < A* and the offense
receives decreasing returns. Thus there is some B < R - 1







B that is feasible is optimal. It can be shown that this
is in fact the case. Also, for a fixed B, there is some
A £ R - 1 that is feasible and the minimum A that satisfies
the constraint must be least cost. Thus the defense fires
three interceptors at the first B R.V.'s, where B is as
small as possible; then fires two interceptors at the next
A - B R.V.'s, where A is as small as possible; and then
fires one interceptor up to the (R - l) s t R.V. at which
point the interceptor supply is exhausted. Values of A and
B can be easily computed. Then
R-l
I = E, i = 3B + 2(A-B) +R-1-A-B=B+A+R-1
m=l m K J
Figure 10 illustrates this last case. It is clear that again
the optimal offense strategy is r° = R, with three alternate






The determination of the firing doctrine for small tar-
gets is trivial, and the firing doctrine for medium targets
is a special case of that for large targets. The large tar-
get algorithm is shown in Figure 11. The algorithm is sim-
ple and quite fast. The simplicity of the determination
depends upon the fact that the minimum B that allows a fea-
sible solution minimizes I. This can be shown by letting
B° be the smallest value of B such that feasibility can be
maintained. Given B° , let A be the smallest feasible
value of A. Denote the firing doctrine determined by B and
A by F(B,A).. Suppose B* = B° + 1 allowed us to reduce I
and be feasible. Then F(B*,A*) is feasible, where A* =
A - 2. It can be shown that if F(B°,A°) and F(B*,A*) are
feasible, then F(B*-1,A*+1) = F(B°,A°-1) is feasible. But
F(B°,A°-1) can't be feasible since A was defined to be the
minimum A which maintains feasibility. Thus F(B*,A*) is not
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For any level of allowable offensive payoff, targets
of value close to A* will be allocated only a few intercep-
tors. Considering costs of land, radar, etc., it is not an
efficient policy to set up a defensive complex for the pur-
pose of defending against a small number of re-entry vehicles
One way to "solve" this problem is to arbitrarily agree to
defend a certain number of targets, or equivalently to de-
fend targets above a certain value. The defense is of
course no longer exactly proportional.
The defense of 100 targets of various values is con-
sidered in the example. The target list used approximates
the target structure of the United States, with all cities
over 150,000 being defended and large cities broken into
several targets. No consideration is taken of overlapping
interceptor coverage or of target vulnerability, population
values are approximate, and population is the only measure
of value.. Parametric studies of A* and p were conducted to
determine changes in the firing doctrine and allocation of
interceptors to targets, and to investigate total offense
and defense requirements.
Table I shows the firing doctrine for 10 selected combin-
ations of target value A*, and single shot kill probability p
Table II shows the total defensive interceptor requirement
for various values of A* and p. Table II also shows, for
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DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR 100 TARGET PROBLEM
.
x* ZR p= .8 .9 .92 .94 .96
22 2211 3778 2895 2735 2554 2364
26 1879 3040 2355 2229 2085 1943
30 1630 2537 1969 1862 1754 1644
40 1231 1727 1373 1310 1244 1178
50 997 1296 1048 1001 957 918
TOTAL DEFENSIVE INTERCEPTOR REQU IREMENT
30

ER required by the offense to attack all 100 targets with
exhausting attacks of size r = R.
Since R is now required to be an integer, A(R) is typ-
ically less than X*, and it is no longer the case that the
optimal offensive strategy is to use r = R. For example
at target K (see Table I) , R = 15 but the optimal attack
has been computed to be r° = 10. The payoff for the exhaust
ing attack is A(R) = 25,330 and the payoff for the optimal
attack is A(r°) = 25,960. The attack r = 10 is equivalent
to r = r 4 in Figure 6. Notice however that the payoff with
r = r° is less than A* as required and is only slightly
greater than A(R). Furthermore, if the defense desired
that only exhausting attacks be optimal (so that the of-
fense must attack fewer targets) , only small increases in A





The assumption that the offense knows the defensive
firing doctrine has been useful to easily derive an inter-
ceptor allocation and firing doctrine. The offense however
will generally not have this knowledge. The usefulness of
the model then depends upon how closely the minmax model
approximates the game theoretic model. Everett [5] shows
that for a fixed allocation of interceptors at a target,
the minmax approach allows an offensive payoff that is typ-
ically no more than 10% greater than the mixed strategy
payoff
.
Note that those targets where i =1 for all m the game6 m &
theoretic solution has been attained: minmax = maxmin. At
targets where A > however, game theory solutions can be
used to reduce the allocation of interceptors at the target.




The proportional minmax allocation model minimizes the
number of interceptors required to force the offensive pay-
off (in terms of expected value per re-entry vehicle) to be
less than or equal to a fixed payoff A*. Under the assump-
tion that many defended targets will not be attacked, such
an allocation will minimize the total value destroyed by
the offense. By appropriate choice of A* the model deter-
mines the defensive allocation which minimizes total expec-
ted damage for a fixed number of interceptors.
The model has several attractive features. First, it
allocates interceptors so that price is proportional to
value. This type of defense is attractive since each city
is equally defended. That is, the proportional allocation
forces the offense to be indifferent as to which subset of
defended targets he will attack. Furthermore, the minmax
assumption allows the defense to easily generate interceptor
allocations for various values of p and A*. Finally, the
conceptual simplicity of the proportional defense model pro-
vides insight into the way costs vary in relation to levels
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